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Historically, the foreign policy of the United States was focused mainly
upon two regions: Europe and the Western Hemisphere. The reasons are easily
understood. America’s cultural heritage was overwhelmingly European. In addi-
tion, the countries of Western Europe dominated the globe; the U.S. itself had
once been a colony, and the economic ties with such countries as Great Britain,
Germany and France remained strong. Meanwhile, the Western Hemisphere
represented our near neighbors and presented a combination of promise and
problems, with two 19th Century conflicts (Mexico and Spain-Cuba) taking place.
Earlier, through the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. had attempted to declare the
hemisphere off limits for Europe.
After World War II, however, a major shift began to unfold. The two origi-
nal regions of primary commitment remained important, but the vast Asia-Pacific
region, and especially Northeast Asia, rapidly emerged as Washington’s central
concern, whether the measurement is security, economics or politics. Two wars
were fought in East Asia after World War II in the effort to prevent Communist
expansion and preserve a balance of power. Economic relations between the
U.S. and Asia assumed vital importance. And the United States took an active
role in encouraging and supporting the broad trend from authoritarianism to
democracy on the part of diverse Asian society.
To examine current trends and future prospects in the relations between
the United States and the societies of Northeast Asia is thus essential if we are
to glimpse the prospects of the 21st Century. Since the U.S.-Japan relationship
has had the longest continuity in its present form-nearly fifty years we can
commence our survey with it. Few victors in war have been as generous to the
defeated as was the United States to Japan in the aftermath of World War II.
Economic assistance combined with political restructuring to enable Japan to
reemerge as a stable, developing society within a decade after the war. To be
sure, the Japanese deserve much credit. Policy combined with culture enabled
the society to take maximum advantage of its new opportunities.
In the shadow of the Korean War, security ties were added to those in the
economic and political field. A U.S.-Japan security alliance was formed that has
now existed for almost a half-century, and provides the foundation for the Ameri-
15
 Number 6, 1999The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
can strategic commitment to the region as a whole. Meanwhile, as Japan rose to
become the second largest economy in the world, the economic relations with
the United States reached commanding proportions, of critical importance to
both nations. The two countries also shared a commitment to democracy, al-
though the nature of informal politics, as opposed to institutional politics, dif-
fered significantly, testimony to two very different cultural backgrounds.
Successive American Presidents have pronounced the U.S.-Japan rela-
tionship the most important bilateral relation for the United States now existing.
Like all international relations, this relationship is not without its problems. On
the strategic front, however, there are few difficulties in so far as the U.S. is
concerned. The trend recently has been to heighten the Japanese commitment.
If the revised guidelines first proposed by President Clinton and Prime Minister
Hashimoto in 1996 are approved by the Diet, Japan would be able to extend its
military activities short of combat considerably in the event of conflict, and the
area to be covered would be less restricted. Further, Japan is considering coop-
eration with the U.S. or an independent program in developing a Theatre Missile
Defense system (TMD), a move greatly stimulated by the August 31, 1998 North
Korean firing of a three-stage missile, with the last stage taking it over Japan. An
independent intelligence satellite system is also being contemplated. In addi-
tion, support has grown for amending Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution
so as to give Japan greater military flexibility.
These developments go in the direction of meeting the American demand
for greater cost and risk-sharing on the part of its allies. Yet in truth, the United
States has never been certain of what it want Japan to do with respect to secu-
rity policy. It does not want a nuclear Japan: or does it want Japan to develop an
independent, high-posture military policy. But it has wanted Japan to share
more fully the burdens of maintaining a balance of power. Meanwhile, some
Japanese have asserted that without full rights in the realm of military policy,
Japan will never be accepted as a major power. Why is Japan not a permanent
member of the Security Council? They ask, noting that all such members are
states possessing full military rights, and in addition, are nuclear powers.
The sentiment in Japan for moving toward full military parity with other
major states still represents the views of a distinct minority, and as long as the
U.S. commitment is credible and no major threat is perceived, that is likely to
continue. The concerns expressed by neighboring states about the restoration
of Japanese militarism are exaggerated. Yet nationalism is rising in Japan as
elsewhere in Asia, and the desire to have a status equal to its regional and global
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role is gaining strength. The drive for permanent Security Council membership
will continue. Thus, the capacity and will of the U.S. to support the security
alliance, and   equally   important,   the   creation   of more   adequate multilateral
security structures for the region will be important in the years ahead.
On the economic front, the scene represents a combination of vital impor-
tance to both nations and recurrent tensions. The recent trade imbalance has
been huge. Estimates are that the deficit for the U.S., totaling $55.7 billion in
1997, may have reached nearly $70 billion in 1998. The rapid rise in the Yen in
recent months combined with some decline in American demand may reduce the
imbalance with Japan in the period immediately ahead. Yet as U.S. trade repre-
sentative Charlene Barshefsky said, the current American trade deficit, totaling
an estimated $240 billion in 1998, is conducive to the rise of U.S. protectionist
sentiment, and that can be seen in terms of the demands for protection of steel
and certain other key products.
Thus, the United States has put unremitting pressure on Japan in recent
years to open its markets more broadly and permit greater investment access.
Manufactured imports account for only 4% of the Japanese economy, half the
percentage of U.S. imports, and direct foreign investment in Japan is less than
one-half of 1% compared to more than 7%. In the U.S. Yet with the economic
picture in Japan increasingly cloudy in recent years, and Japanese politics close
to stalemate, movement has been slow. Fundamental economic change in Japan,
moreover, involves cultural change, never a development that can be easy or
rapid.
Yet with internal pressures gradually added to external ones, Japan has
adopted a major economic stimulus package amounting to nearly $200 billion,
and has also launched aid programs for other Asian societies, another American
demand. It remains to be seen, however, whether the measures thus far taken will
bring the Japanese economy out of recession. Meanwhile, resentment against
American pressure has caused some Japanese to join other Asians in decrying
U.S. “bullying.”
In the decades ahead, Japan is virtually certain to remain a major economic
force in Asia and in the world. It now stands on the frontiers of science and
technology, capable of innovating as well as borrowing. Its people are commit-
ted to further development and have the requisite skills. And its economy will be
internationalized on an ever more intensive scale. At the same time, challenges
lie ahead, chief among them the aging of Japan’s population. By 2015, one-
fourth of that population will be 65 years of age or older. The implications in
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terms of social security costs and the labor market are huge. It will be critical that
Japan and the U.S. cooperate closely in advancing the upper scale of their
service economies and at the same time, making globalization safer and more
effective for all nations.
Japan is also destined to pay a higher cost for modernization in terms of
social pressures. Crime will increase from the current low rate, as will divorce.
Generational differences will continue to expand. In these respects, the U.S. and
Japan will develop a greater commonality as two leading post-modern societies,
making more extensive cultural interaction important, especially between younger
generations.
Democracy—and the problems it presents—will continue to be a common
bond between the two countries. Money politics, issues of leadership, and the
worrisome problem of electorate indifference warrant continuous attention. On
the security front, the threat in Asia is less likely to be that of a major power
conflict, and more likely to be domestic violence within failing states, terrorism
by disaffected individuals and groups, and ethnic-religious cleavages turned
violent. Yet the issue of divided states—the two Koreas and China-Taiwan—
represent formidable problems, susceptible to conflict. Further, relations be-
tween India and Pakistan, and India and China, remain worrisome. Hence, the
need for effective multilateral security mechanisms will grow in the years ahead,
and both the U.S. and Japan must play a role in this respect.
Finally, for these two nations, it will be critical to take leading roles in
seeking to reach broad agreements with others on the issues of resource man-
agement, pollution control, and scientific agriculture—the survival issues of the
next century.
In sum, there are strong reasons to believe that the relationship between
the United States and Japan will continue to be important not only to these two
nations, but to the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole,
and especially to Northeast Asia.
Turning to the United States and China, the picture is at least equally
complex. In the years since the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, relations between
these two countries have generally improved. The reasons are several. First, the
leaders of both nations came to realize the importance of a positive relationship
in terms of virtually every issue confronting the region. Second, China discov-
ered that the U.S. President does not make foreign policy alone; consequently,
it sought ways to reach Congress and the American public, seeking to improve
its image. Third, economic relations between the two nations advanced rapidly
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notwithstanding various problems, and the U.S. business community increas-
ingly supported a policy of engagement with China. Finally, the ideological
barrier was further reduced, with a greater element of pragmatism operative in
China.
At the same time, as the 20th Century comes to a close, this relationship
faces various challenges. On the strategic front, gains have been made: regular
military exchanges and conferences have been held; in 1998, for the first time, a
joint U.S.-PRC search and rescue exercise took place; and transparency was
increased, symbolized by the visit of Secretary of Defense Cohen to a once-
secret defense center in Beijing.
Yet in late 1998, a bipartisan House of Representatives committee prepared
a report asserting that in the last twenty years, China had obtained sensitive
American military technology, some through sales such as satellite exports,
some through other means. Controversy over past Chinese technology trans-
fers to Iran and Pakistan has also erupted, although the Chinese currently assert
that the sale of missiles to Iran has been halted. Further, China has indicated
serious concern about the projected U.S. Theater and National Missile Defense
programs, especially as TMD may relate to Taiwan and Japan.
Indeed, the key issue between the two countries according to Beijing is
that of Taiwan. China insists that the U.S. must abide by the pledges contained
in the Three Communiqués as it interprets these documents, namely, an accep-
tance of One China and Taiwan as a part of China, and opposition to the inclu-
sion of Taiwan in any organization composed of sovereign states. It also asserts
that military sales to Taiwan constitute interference in the internal affairs of
another state. The United States walks cautiously along two paths: The Three
Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. Under provisions of the Act, mili-
tary sales continue and that is not likely to change. And while the U.S. privately
admonishes Taiwan to avoid provocative actions and makes clear its opposition
to any declaration of independence, Taiwan’s image in the United States is
generally good, with its economic progress and democratic system lauded.
The Taiwan issue will not disappear. While high level talks between Tai-
wan and China have taken place in the recent past, and economic and cultural
relations have both expanded significantly, the critical political issues remain
unresolved. Taiwan insists that it remains a separate, sovereign entity, and war-
rants equality with the PRC in all negotiations. The Kuomintang and the Demo-
cratic Progressive Party have drawn closer together in views and policies re-
cently, with the latter eschewing a formal declaration of independence, and the
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former using terms like sovereign in describing the current status of Taiwan.
Thus, the political gap between the PRC and Taiwan remains large. The critical
issue at present is whether both sides can live with the status-quo, even though
it is certain to be a dynamic status-quo, with changes often taking place or
sought by one party or the other.
U.S. policy on the issue of force is one of conscious ambiguity. The United
States will not state precisely what it would do in the event the PRC elected to
use force against Taiwan. To guarantee support for Taiwan would aid the inde-
pendence movement; to pledge non-involvement would aid the hard line ele-
ments in Beijing. Moreover, either position would deeply split the American
community. Hence, the U.S. restricts its views to urging a peaceful settlement,
and. until that is achieved, a willingness to live with the conditions that exist.
Another issue relates to Tibet and the Dalai Lama. Once again, the U.S.
has urged discussions between Beijing and the Dalai Lama, but China insists
that he first aver his support for One China, state that Taiwan is a part of China,
and disavow all separatist activities. Thus far, no official discussions have taken
place. Meanwhile, the recent visit of the Dalai Lama to Washington, and his
informal meeting with President Clinton among others aroused Beijing’s wrath.
Human rights within China have been an additional recurrent subject of
controversy. In recent times, China has signed the International Covenant on
Political and Human Rights, and a greater quotient of political flexibility exists
than at any time in PRC history. The broad movement is from Leninism to au-
thoritarian pluralism, namely, a politics that is still restrictive, but less rigid, a
more active civil society separate from the state, and a mixed economy with the
private sector playing an ever larger role. While there will be retreats on occa-
sion, a fundamental reversal of these trends is highly unlikely.
The current scene illustrates these facts. Generally, the freedom to talk and
even to publish some materials critical of current policies has expanded. Yet
those who seek to organize an opposition party or engage in extensive criticism
in print are punished. With signs of peasant and labor unrest increasingly promi-
nent, the Beijing government is concerned about stability. But it is also a time of
testing for those who would oppose-to determine what can and cannot be done.
The United States will remain critical of acts considered violations of hu-
man rights. China will continue to charge the U.S. with seeking to implant its
system on others, thus interfering in China’s domestic affairs. Moreover, it will
denounce the “univocal world” now perceived to exist, and call for multipolarism
even as it seeks to create “strategic partnerships” with the large states on a
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bilateral basis.
Looking ahead, China will be a major power in the coming century, but one
facing major problems. The modernization of 1.3 billion people, eventually to be
at least 1.6 billion, is not easy. Economic difficulties and regional differences will
persist. Hence, the gamble of all of China’s neighbors is that a combination of
domestic challenges and growing economic internationalization will cause China
to pursue a moderate, peace-oriented foreign policy, thereby matching deeds
with China’s words—truly peaceful coexistence. Yet given its military modern-
ization and advancing economic strength, China’s actions will be watched care-
fully by all others.
U.S. policy toward China will be characterized by continued efforts to
affect a relationship that is on balance positive, employing a combination of
incentives and deterrents to encourage the positive interaction of China with
others in the region.   Given the common interests that now exist, cautious
optimism with respect to Sino-American relations is warranted—without mini-
mizing the issues to be faced.
Meanwhile, relations between the United States and the two Koreas con-
stitute another crucial element in the East Asian picture. Since the accession of
Kim Dae-Jung to the Presidency in early 1998, U.S-ROK relations have been
very good on balance. In seeking to alleviate South Korea’s serious economic
distress, President Kim has supported economic policies favored by the IMF
and the U.S., with some signs of progress after many months of pain. Advances
in ROK-Japan relations have also been heralded by Washington. Further, Kim’s
efforts to improve relations with the North have generally met with Washington’s
support. In turn, Seoul has continued to urge the U.S. to uphold the Agreed
Framework Agreement of October 1994 between the U.S. and the DPRK, and to
move forward with the KEDO program dedicated to constructing a Light Water
Reactor for the North.
There are certain problems. As in the case of Japan, the U.S. wants the
ROK to open its markets more fully, and carry out its promised program to
reduce cartelization, a difficult task given the attitude of the cabal (big com-
bines) and the labor unions. In both countries, moreover, opinion is deeply
divided over the issue of policies toward the DPRK, with a sizeable group be-
lieving that a tougher policy should be enforced. Indeed, given the North’s
recent actions and rhetoric, the skeptics in the U.S. and the ROK have increased
in numbers, despite such events as the access given Hyundai to promote tour-
ism and economic development in the Mt. Kumgang area of the North. On
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balance, however, U.S.-ROK relations are better than at any time in the recent
past, and the strategic alliance is firm.
Relations with the DPRK remain minimal and troubled. Pyongyang is an-
gry with the U.S. because of the slowdown in pledged heavy oil shipments, and
the delays in carrying out KEDO.
Negotiations on such matters as the underground facility suspected by
some Americans of being constructed for purposes of resuming nuclear activi-
ties, have been exceedingly difficult. Nonetheless, small energy and agricultural
teams have come to the United States to interact with American counterparts,
and meanwhile, five individuals were sent to Australia National University for a
one-year training program in business, with American Foundation funding.
Another group was studying legal matters in Beijing with an American supervi-
sor. Slowly and with great caution, the DPRK is turning out, with modest Ameri-
can assistance.
Will Korean reunification cause a major change in U.S. policy toward the
peninsula? The critical issue here is when and how will reunification take place?
If it comes quickly, and through some form of North Korean collapse, the South
will be in great need of economic support, and will also experience severe politi-
cal problems in the effort to absorb—or keep separate-some twenty-two million
people accustomed to a very different political order. The United States together
with Japan and China would undoubtedly render assistance, yet possibly with
some degree of rivalry or tension.
If reunification takes place peacefully, through an evolutionary process,
and over a protracted period of time, the American role will presumably be one of
increasing interaction with the North, both economic and cultural, while main-
taining a firm commitment to the South. After reunification, the Korean people
will decide whether a strategic connection with the U.S. is necessary and desir-
able, an issue that will also require the decision of the American people. Neigh-
boring states, and especially China, will be deeply concerned with this matter.
Whether Korea elects to maintain a strategic tie with the U.S., possibly
based on sea and air power rather than ground forces, or seeks a balanced,
equidistant relation with all major powers will be an issue for the future-but with
lessons from the past no doubt seriously restudied.
Let us next turn to U.S.-Russia relations. While the Russian Federation is
a Eurasian nation, with much of its attention devoted to Europe, the Middle East
and South Asia, it also has a vital stake in East Asia, and particularly Northeast
Asia. At present, relations between Moscow and such regions as Primo sky
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(with its capital, Vladivostok) are troubled. For some seventy years during the
Soviet era, the Russian Far East sent its products, including extensive military
items, to Moscow and was subsidized in exchange. Now this system has broken
down, and the economy of the Russian Far East is deeply depressed. Even the
RFE military has been affected, with much equipment obsolete and the morale of
the armed forces low.
Nevertheless, given its resources, the Russian Far East can be a vital part
of Northeast Asia once economic recovery takes place. At some, point, it will
play a prominent role in the creation of 4 Natural Economic Territory (NET)
comprising the states bordering the Sea of Japan (East Sea). A NET is an eco-
nomic entity that crosses political boundaries, combining resources, manpower,
capital and technology to mutual advantage between or among states or por-
tions of states having geographic proximity and complimentary capacities. Pipe-
lines will eventually connect Siberia with key Asian regions, with metal produc-
tion also an important link along with joint jurisdiction over fishing. Foreign
investment will abet the development of the RFE and immigrant labor will be a
prominent issue.
Despite efforts to maintain closer ties, U.S.-Russian relations have been
troubled recently by a series of problems. Washington has been unhappy with
the inability of Russian leadership to get their economic house in order, and the
near-chaos prevailing in the political realm. Russia has deeply resented the
expansion of NATO despite some efforts to adjust to that development, and
now, it strongly criticizes the U.S. plans with respect to missile defense, includ-
ing the possible involvement of Japan. Thus, the Duma has not ratified START
II at this point, thereby delaying the process of denuclearization. Meanwhile,
there is increasing concern over the possibility of an accident with respect to
Russia’s aging nuclear stockpiles.
Recently, Russia and China proclaimed a “strategic partnership,” with the
proclamation that “hegemony” should be resisted, and multipolarism sought.
Yet the U.S. is not deeply concerned about a revived Sino-Russian alignment.
Russia—and in particular, the Russian Far East—is deeply conscious of the
massive nation to the south. Given the sparse population of the latter region,
with scarcely 8 million people in residence, the possibility of a wave of Chinese
migrants, however improbable, is worrisome. Further, while an important agree-
ment has been reached among Russia, China and the three Central Asian states
regarding demilitarization of the border and troop reduction, Central Asia will
always be a contested area in so far as the two giant neighbors are concerned. In
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South Asia also, the alignments are in opposition.
Russia is also having problems in achieving a peace treaty with Japan by
the year 2000, as has been pledged. The key issue remains the so-called North-
ern Territories, or in Russian parlance, the South Kuris. It now seems unlikely
that Moscow will cede any territory to Japan, given strong nationalist opposi-
tion. Joint development may not suffice for Tokyo. Thus, a settlement in not
presently in sight.
Against this background, U.S.-Russian relations might logically be ex-
pected to improve, the strategic issues notwithstanding. However, the road is
likely to be rocky. A combination of NATO expansion and TMD\NMD develop-
ment may lead to a growing Russian sense of threat, especially given its eco-
nomic limitations at present. Already, individuals like Evgeny Primakov have
sought to reestablish Russia as a global power, waving aside the “Westernizes”
who wanted a closer alignment with the U.S. and the EU.
Nonetheless, if the United States persists in seeking to provide Russia
with some economic aid and political support, meanwhile attempting to reassure
Moscow that missile defense is not aimed at it, and NATO poses no threat,
relations may improve. In the final analysis, the threats to Russia are firstly
domestic, and in secondary terms, the attitudes and policies of diverse neigh-
bors over the next several decades. Weak neighbors, threatened with internal
violence combine with others growing increasingly strong. And Russia itself
faces the prodigious task of reconstructing a nation shattered by recent events.
A strong, supportive America could be an asset.
Finally, let me turn to Mongolia, a nation small in population, but large in
area and located in a strategically position of great importance. In recent times,
Mongolia has faced the problems of departing from both a system and a spon-
sor. In the Soviet era, a rigid authoritarian socialist order at home was bolstered
by the military power and economic assistance of the Soviet Union. Not surpris-
ingly, the transition to a democracy with a market orientation has been fraught
with difficulties.
In this setting, the United States has acted in both official and non-official
capacities, with the latter perhaps being the most significant. Assistance has
been given by such organizations as the Asia Foundation and the Sores Foun-
dation to strengthen the legislative system, to help in creating a reformed legal
structure, and to assist in the training of diverse individuals. Institutes in the
United States and Mongolia have cosponsored international conferences, with
the effort to reach a common understanding regarding regional problems and
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bilateral relations.
Given its geographic position, Mongolia must maintain a foreign policy
dedicated to balanced relations with all of the major powers. The close presence
of China and Russia dictates that special attention is given to expanding rela-
tions with Japan and the United States. There is safety in numbers. Hence,
current American policies generally touch a receptive audience in Ulaanbaatar.
In conclusion, how should one view current U.S. policy with respect to the
nations of Northeast Asia, and prospects for the future? American ties with the
major powers of the region will always be complex, with some combination of
cooperation and tension. The task will be to keep bilateral relations on balance
favorable, and that is eminently possible. No major state wants a conflict with
another, given the devastating costs of modern war. The focus of each state is
firstly on domestic challenges as the global revolution advances with accelerat-
ing speed. One of the rising challenges is likely to terrorism at home, as dissi-
dents obtain weapons of great destructive capacity.
Bilateral relations between key nations will continue to be vitally impor-
tant, but we are progressively moving into an age of multilateralism. In its initial
stages, multilateral institutions, especially those devoted to peace making and
peace keeping, are fragile, with decisions difficult to reach and to enforce. Yet
over time, such organizations as a Northeast Asian Security Dialogue will emerge,
with increasing impact on the region.
Meanwhile, modem weaponry is changing the nature of security. With
intercontinental missiles and diverse weapons of mass destruction proliferat-
ing, future war involving major states, if it concurs, will affect cities and civilians
as much as military forces. Further, rapid deployment rather than ground forces
in foreign bases will be the trend. However, the United States will not remove its
forces from Japan   and   South   Korea   prematurely,   thereby   creating
instability throughout the region.
Efforts should also be expended to make the development of missile de-
fenses as non-threatening as possible.
The United States will remain deeply engaged in Northeast Asia for eco-
nomic and political as well as security reasons. Learning how to live with global-
ization will remain a foremost challenge, and the U.S. will remain a key factor. Its
economy will become increasingly intertwined with that of others, and from time
to time, protectionist sentiments will be loudly voiced. However, given Ameri-
can interests, the commitment to free trade and open markets will remain domi-
nant.
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As noted earlier, American cooperation with others in tackling more seri-
ously the issues of resource management, environmental pollution, and popula-
tion trends will be critically important. These issues are vital to the future of
Northeast Asia, and they have thus far received too little sustained attention.
The U.S. can and must harness its scientists to its governmental officials, work-
ing with others on these tasks.
The U.S. commitment to political openness will continue, but Washington
must guard against arrogance, and accept the fact that certain nations are not
prepared for democracy, given their stage of development and cultural anteced-
ents. The argument about Asian values versus Western values is largely sterile
since there are many differences within both Asia and the West. Even within a
given society, life-styles and commitments vary greatly. Note the difference
between an educated Shanghai youth and a middle-aged Gansu peasant. Fur-
thermore, in this period of rapid change and intensive cultural interaction, where
are there pure cultures and values? The supreme challenge is to adjust to the
complexity of modern life, and meeting that challenge is paramount for the United
States and its citizens, as it is for others.
In sum, the United States will pursue two broad approaches in its Asian
policies: the construction of a coalition of powers and of a balance of power.
Coalitions will be created to tackle specific issues or problems like that of a
divided Korea. They will be built by bringing together those states that have a
common interest in solving the issue at hand; hence, they will vary in composi-
tion with the issue. At the same time, given the strong nationalism now present
in Asia, the commitment to weapon modernization, and the many unresolved
problems, it will be essential to maintain a balance of power. These two commit-
ments are not incompatible, as some critics aver. Indeed, in varying degree, they
are already present.
On balance, one can view the future with cautious optimism. The age
ahead will be one of continuous, rapid development for all of the societies of
Northeast Asia, albeit, with occasional adverse cycles. With cultural exchange
growing, the capacity for greater understanding, as well as more extensive bor-
rowing will exist. All nations must take advantage of the opportunities that are
now on the horizon.
